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ABSTRACT 
In McDonald v McDonald [2016] UKSC 28, the Supreme Court held that there was no breach of 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights if a private landlord sought to evict a 
tenant using the accelerated possession procedure.  In reaching this decision, it refused to imply a 
proportionality test into the Housing Act 1988 or make a declaration of incompatibility under the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  Against that background, this article provides an analysis of the 
theoretical and practical concerns affecting a tenant’s Article 8 rights to respect for the home, as 
well as a landlord’s correlative duties.  It concludes that these rights will only be protected 
adequately and in accordance with the rule of law if legislation is introduced, with the aim of 
protecting a tenant’s dignity.  That is necessary both for legal certainty and to ensure that a fair 
balance is struck between the interests of landlord and tenant.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) was incorporated into English law 
by the Human Rights Act 1998, there has been an ongoing dialogue between the UK Supreme 
Court and Strasbourg as to the extent that a tenant’s right to respect for the home should be 
recognised. This culminated in the judgment in Manchester City Council v Pinnock,1 in which the 
Supreme Court held that Article 8 could form a defence to possession proceedings if the landlord 
was a public authority and the tenant’s eviction was disproportionate. It was against this 
background that there has been growing speculation as to whether Article 8 can apply to 
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possession claims in the private rented sector. By way of explanation, under the Human Rights 
Act 1998, it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.2 However, there is no such corresponding obligation on private 
individuals. Nevertheless, as the definition of ‘public authority’ included courts and tribunals,3 
there was an unanswered question as to whether proceedings between private individuals should 
be subject to a similar proportionality test. In other words, are the English courts required to imply 
a test of proportionality into possession claims between private individuals in order to comply with 
their duty to interpret domestic legislation in accordance with the ECHR?4  Put simply, can it be 
said that the Human Rights Act 1998 has horizontal effect in England and Wales?    
That issue was recently settled in McDonald v McDonald, 5when the UK Supreme Court rejected 
a tenant’s argument that she should be able to challenge her eviction on the basis that it was a 
disproportionate interference with her right to respect for the home under Article 8. More 
specifically, it held that domestic legislation already provided tenants with adequate protection 
from eviction,6 even if the claim was brought under the accelerated procedure where there is no 
formal requirement on a landlord to demonstrate fault7 and possession is often granted without a 
hearing.8 Aside from that, the Supreme Court found that there was no coherent body of case law 
from Strasbourg that allowed the ECHR to be invoked to vary contractual arrangements that had 
been agreed between private individuals.  Rather, any changes to the rights of a landlord or a tenant 
were a matter for Parliament. 
In light of the judgment in McDonald v McDonald,9 this article will examine how the English 
courts have dealt with Article 8 in the context of the relationship between landlord and tenant. It 
will argue that English jurisprudence benefits individuals who own a property, rather than those 
who have a different type of interest, such as a licence or tenancy. As such, it fails to take account 
of the attachment that a tenant or an occupier may have to her home,10 or the role that it plays in 
constituting her personality and personhood.11 Without a home, an individual may find that her 
dignity is undermined which, in turn, could have an effect on her everyday life. In essence, she is 
being denied the opportunity for human flourishing12 and for her capabilities to be developed.13    
Despite these concerns, this article will contend that the balance of rights between landlord and 
tenant should not be determined through the imposition of a proportionality test based on the 
judgment in Pinnock.14 If the Supreme Court had introduced such a test, there would be real 
uncertainty over the operation of possession claims in the private rented sector, with the courts 
attempting to strike a fair balance between a tenant’s human rights and those of the landlord. In 
any event, it remains unclear as to how a private landlord can act proportionately in seeking 
possession of her property, and whether she would ever have enough information about a tenant’s 
personal circumstances to be able to do so. It follows that if the British Government wants to 
address the issue of tenants’ rights, this would be better done through domestic housing legislation, 
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rather than via the courts’ ad hoc use of the ECHR under the Human Rights Act 1998.  That way, 
a tenant’s dignity could be better protected during possession proceedings, while a landlord would 
be provided with greater certainty as to the considerations that the courts would take into account 
in any eviction. 
 
 
 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT IN MCDONALD V MCDONALD 
 
 
The Factual Background to McDonald  
 
The judgment in McDonald15 concerned the eviction of Miss Fiona McDonald from her home at 
25 Broadway Close in Witney.  Miss McDonald suffered from serious psychiatric and behavioural 
problems, which meant that she was unable to work and became upset about changes to her 
environment. Due to Miss McDonald’s condition and her eviction from two previous social 
tenancies, her parents decided to purchase a property for her to rent, using a mortgage provided 
by Capital Homes Limited (‘Capital Homes’). It was intended that Miss McDonald would live at 
25 Broadway Close under a series of assured shorthold tenancies, with her parents being the 
landlords, and the rent being paid using housing benefit. The mortgage from Capital Homes 
Limited was an interest-only loan, with the capital to be repaid after eight years and no later than 
12 April 2013. 
Although Miss McDonald’s parents initially managed to pay the mortgage, they quickly fell into 
arrears as a result of financial difficulties with their business.  That led to Capital Homes appointing 
receivers in August 2008, under the mortgagee’s usual statutory powers.16 At first, the receivers 
allowed Miss McDonald to remain in the property as the arrears were not substantial, and her 
parents continued to make payments to Capital Homes. However, since the arrears persisted, the 
receivers served a Section 21 notice on Miss McDonald seeking possession of the property from 
14 March 2012. After the notice expired, the receivers commenced proceedings against Miss 
McDonald to recover possession of the property. This was resisted by Miss McDonald, acting 
through her brother, Duncan, as her litigation friend. Relying on the report of an expert 
psychiatrist, they argued that Miss McDonald’s eviction would be disproportionate in light of her 
‘right to respect for the home’ under Article 8 of the ECHR.   
At first instance, Corrie J held that he had no jurisdiction to refuse the receivers’ application or 
consider the proportionality of Miss McDonald’s eviction under Article 8, since her landlord was 
not a public authority. Yet, had he been able to do so, he would have refused to make an order for 
possession in favour of the receivers. In the view of Corrie J, Miss McDonald’s eviction gave rise 
to sufficiently exceptional circumstances, taking into account her mental health, previous violent 
behaviour and the difficulties she would face in finding alternative accommodation. This ruling 
formed the basis of Miss McDonald’s appeal, with the Court of Appeal17 and, finally, the Supreme 
Court being asked to consider whether a judge is required to examine the proportionality of a 
tenant’s eviction from privately rented accommodation and, if so, whether it is possible to imply 
such a test into the relevant legislation in the Housing Act 1988.18 
 
 
 
The Decision of the Court of Appeal 
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In its judgment, the Court of Appeal accepted that Article 8 was engaged: the property at 25 
Broadway Close was Miss McDonald’s home and s 6 Human Rights Act 1998 provided that the 
court was a public authority.  It further noted that Article 8 allows a social renter to challenge the 
proportionality of her eviction, as was set out in Manchester City Council v Pinnock19 and London 
Borough of Hounslow v Powell.20 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Miss 
McDonald should be able to challenge the proportionality of her eviction under Article 8, finding 
that it was bound by the decision in Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v 
Donoghue.21In the leading judgment, Arden LJ held that for Miss McDonald’s appeal to succeed, 
she would have to demonstrate that the ECtHR had applied the proportionality test to possession 
claims by private landlords as part of: 
 
‘a clear and consistent line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some 
fundamental, substantive or procedural aspect of our law and whose reasoning does 
not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle’.22   
 
Even though there were a small number of cases where the ECtHR had applied the 
proportionality test to a possession claim by a private landlord, Arden LJ held that they could be 
distinguished from the arguments advanced by Miss McDonald.  In particular, there were no 
successful claims under Article 8 that involved a case in which the landlord had an unconditional 
right to the return of the property and the date for possession had passed.  There was also a public 
element to the cases that had been cited in support of Miss McDonald’s argument. So, for example, 
Brezec v Croatia23 concerned the eviction of a tenant by a former state corporation that had been 
privatised. Similarly, in Zehentner v Austria,24 the court had to consider whether there was a violation 
of Article 8 in respect of a forced judicial sale at the instance of a creditor. Developing her 
argument further, Arden LJ held that in the judgments cited, the ECtHR had proceeded on the 
basis that Article 8 was applicable, but without considering the terms of tenant’s occupation of the 
land, or whether the landlord was a public authority in sufficient detail.  They also had not been 
determined by the Grand Chamber.  By contrast, there is a clear principle that private individuals 
should not be able to invoke the ECHR as a means of avoiding their obligations under a freely 
negotiated contract.25   
Finally, it is of interest to note that the Court of Appeal would have reversed the judgment of 
Corrie J and held that Miss McDonald’s eviction was proportionate.  Arden LJ remarked that in a 
possession claim, a landlord is simply asserting her right to the return of the property in 
circumstances where she may have suffered a loss as a result of the tenant’s actions.  In addition, 
the interests of banks, creditors, and other third parties could have been prejudiced by the court’s 
failure to make a possession order in favour of the landlord.  For the Court of Appeal, these 
considerations were no less important than the interests of a homeless individual or the ability of 
a social landlord to recover possession of its housing stock.  As such, it was highly relevant that 
over £200,000 was owed to Capital Homes, which could not be recovered by the lender without 
the court making a possession order against Miss McDonald.   
 
 
The Supreme Court’s Ruling in McDonald  
                                                             
19 Manchester City Council v Pinnock (n 1). 
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In the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale handed down a joint judgment with which 
Lords Kerr, Reed, and Carnwath concurred. Approving the Court of Appeal’s ruling, they held 
that Miss McDonald was unable to challenge her eviction under Article 8. However, in its 
judgment, the Supreme Court placed far more emphasis on the statutory regulation of the private 
rented sector, as well as the difficulty in balancing a landlord and tenant’s respective Convention 
rights. In their commentary on the private rented sector, Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale noted 
that, in 1987, the Thatcher Government produced a White Paper entitled Housing: The Government's 
Proposals.26 This White Paper indicated that the Government wished to improve both the supply 
and the quality of housing in the private rented sector, but to do so, it needed to reduce the security 
of tenure that was afforded to tenants under the Rent Act 1977. This led to the introduction of 
the assured shorthold tenancy in the Housing Act 1988, which later became the default form of 
tenure.27 With an assured shorthold tenancy, a landlord is able to recover possession of a property 
by giving the tenant two months’ notice in writing: there is no requirement to provide a reason for 
the eviction or demonstrate fault.   
Against that background, Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale held that the respective duties and 
obligations of a residential landlord and tenant were set out in both the tenancy agreement and the 
legislation enacted by Parliament.28 Together, this represented the state’s assessment of a fair 
balance of the parties’ rights under the ECHR. Therefore, ‘a super-added requirement of 
addressing the issue of proportionality’29 in any possession claim would be an imposition that did 
not respect the purpose of domestic legislation. Moreover, if a tenant’s rights under Article 8 were 
enforceable against a private landlord, that would lead to unpredictability.  They would need to be 
balanced against the landlord’s rights to recover the property under Article 1, Protocol 1 and, in 
that respect, it is unclear if a landlord would be compensated for any losses she may suffer. Aside 
from that, Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale further explained that Article 8 could only be invoked 
where a possession claim comes before the courts. As such, there may be a perverse incentive for 
landlords to carry out unlawful evictions, or offer tenants money to leave a property. In effect, a 
more stringent proportionality test may act as a disincentive to those acting legally and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Housing Act 1988. 
Regarding the courts’ interpretation of the Housing Act 1988, Miss McDonald argued that the 
legislation could be read in such a way, so as to allow the judge to assess the proportionality of any 
order. This submission was even accepted by the Residential Landlords’ Association, intervening 
in the case. Regardless of that, the Supreme Court held that such an interpretation was not possible.  
In reaching this decision, it relied on the fact that a private tenant would not be able to challenge 
the lawfulness of her landlord’s actions on the basis of Wednesbury30 unreasonableness. By contrast, 
this course of action is open to a social renter with a demoted or introductory tenancy31 and, 
further, there is a requirement on a public authority or a housing association to provide reasons 
for terminating such an agreement.32 Since these public sector duties do not apply to private 
landlords, it follows that neither does the proportionality test set out in Pinnock33 and Powell.34  
Taking this into account, Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale held that even if the words in s 21(4) 
Housing Act 1988 did introduce an element of proportionality, the most that could be done was 
for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility.35 This would not have affected the outcome 
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of Miss McDonald’s claim, but rather the matter would have been referred to Parliament to amend 
the relevant provisions of the Housing Act 1988 if it so chose.  
Finally, the Supreme Court considered whether Miss McDonald’s eviction would have been a 
disproportionate interference with her right to respect for the home under Article 8. Here, Lord 
Neuberger and Lady Hale noted that there were several options open to a judge hearing a 
possession claim: she could refuse to make the order, suspend or postpone it for a period of up to 
six weeks, or accept the claim on the grounds it was justified.36 They further noted that it was rare 
for a tenant’s Article 8 defence to succeed against a social landlord unless it raised other public law 
arguments. As a result, it was difficult to envisage when a tenant’s Article 8 defence would succeed 
against a private landlord. In this case, Miss McDonald’s parents owed Capital Homes over 
£164,000, which could only be repaid through the sale of the property.  Taking that into account, 
Miss McDonald would need to demonstrate that not only was her eviction disproportionate, but 
also that Capital Homes would not be prevented from recovering the outstanding capital sum or 
any arrears. Unfortunately, she was unable to do so. 
 
 
 
II. TOWARDS A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR 
THE HOME   
 
 
The Importance of Ownership in English Law  
 
According to Cowan, the origins of the rhetoric surrounding home ownership can be traced back 
to Victorian self-help literature.37 In particular, Cowan refers to Samuel Smiles,38 who first drew 
the link between hard work, thrift, property, and morality. For, as Smiles explained in a lecture in 
1864:   
The accumulation of property has the effect, which it has always had upon thrifty 
men; it makes them steady, sober and diligent… they will cease to regard the 
sight of others’ wellbeing as a wrong inflicted on themselves; and it will no longer 
be possible to make political capital out of their imaginary woes.39      
 
Over time, that rationale developed, and it contributed to the the growth of the building society 
movement in the early twentieth century. Notably, in 1927, Harold Bellman described ownership 
as a ‘civic and national asset’, with both moral and ethical benefits.40 Later on, in the 1980s, this 
preference for home ownership as a form of tenure continued, with the Thatcher Government 
introducing policies such as the deregulation of the mortgage market41 and the introduction of the 
right to buy.42     
Against that background, Singer has argued that there are two competing models of ownership, 
being the ‘lord in a castle’ and an ‘investor in a market economy’.43 The metaphor of the owner as 
the ‘lord in a castle’ derives from Sir Edward Coke’s judgment in Semayne’s Case,44 and was later 
                                                             
36 Housing Act 1980, s 89(1).  
37 D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2011) 31. 
38 S Smiles, Self-Help (Oxford University Press 2002). 
39 See S Price, Building Societies: Their Origins and History (Franey & Co 1959), 139-140. 
40 D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2011), 31. 
41 Building Societies Act 1986.  
42 Housing Act 1980, s 1. 
43 J Singer, ‘The Ownership Society and the Takings of Property: Castles, Investments and Just Obligations’ (2006) 30 
Harvard Environmental Law Review 309, 314. 
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upheld in Entick v Carrington.45 As an owner, an individual is free to use her property as she so 
chooses, without unreasonable interference from others or from the state. Nowadays, this can be 
seen in Atkinson and Blandy’s concepts of defensive homeownership46 and the domestic fortress 
in which ‘social anxiety, inequality and profound economic changes… produces a defensive and 
physically bolstered form of home ownership’.47 By way of contrast, a Lockean understanding of 
property48 supports Singer’s conception of the owner as a market investor. Arguably, it follows 
that if an individual has applied her labour to land or an object, she should be rewarded with any 
increase in value or return on her investment. For Singer, this model protects an investor’s 
legitimate expectation that she should be able to exploit property for commercial gain.   
Returning to housing, it is common for a distinction to be drawn between renting and 
ownership in both everyday conversation49 and the academic literature.50 This is illustrated by the 
use of analogy and metaphor in our language, such as renting is ‘dead money’ or ‘money down the 
drain’, while homeownership is perceived as ‘an investment for the future’, with the property being 
‘yours at the end of the day’.51 As Gurney explained, these metaphors are imbued with morality, 
but they have become so common that their status or accuracy is rarely challenged.52 It is in these 
circumstances that the English courts have upheld the rights of an owner against an occupier in 
the judgment in McDonald,53 despite the arguments made by Miss McDonald that her eviction was 
disproportionate. 
To an extent, the judgment in McDonald54 can be justified by making reference to Honoré’s 
incidents of ownership55, namely: (i) the right to use; (ii) the right to possess; (iii) the right to 
manage; (iv) the right to income; (v) the right to capital; (vi) the right to security; (vii) 
transmissibility; (viii) the absence of term; (ix) prohibition of harmful use; (x) liability to execution; 
and (xi) its residuary nature. This means that as owners, Miss McDonald’s parents were able to let 
the property at 25 Broadway Close and claim any rental income. They could impose restrictions 
on Miss McDonald’s tenancy, preventing her from altering the property without their consent or 
keeping a pet.  Furthermore, by owning the property, Miss McDonald’s parents were able to obtain 
a mortgage and divest some of their rights to Capital Homes. Since they subsequently fell into 
arrears, it followed that Capital Homes was able to appoint receivers to manage the property56 and 
exercise that incident of ownership. Even though the receivers were agents of Miss McDonald’s 
parents, they could not provide them with any instructions or direct them how to act.57 Instead, 
the receivers were under a duty to realise the property for the benefit of the lender, Capital 
Homes.58     
From a rights perspective, this emphasis on ownership is unsurprising, particularly given the 
residuary nature of this interest. After all, it is usually the owner who is able to exercise control 
                                                             
45 Entick v Carrington (1765) EWHC J98 (KB); 19 Howell's State Trials 1029; 95 ER 807. 
46 R Atkinson and S Blandy, ‘Panic Room: The Rise of Defensive Homeownership’ (2007) 22 Housing Studies 443.  
47 R Atkinson and S Blandy, Domestic Fortress: Fear and the Home Front (Manchester University Press 2017) 21. 
48 J Locke, Second Treatise of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration (Oxford University Press 2016).   
49 C Gurney, ‘Lowering the Drawbridge: A Case Study of Analogy and Metaphor in the Social Construction of 
Homeownership’ (1999) 36 Urban Studies 1705.  
50 P Saunders, A Nation of Home Owners (Allen & Unwin 1990); P King, Housing Policy Transformed: The Right to Buy and 
The Desire to Own (Policy Press 2010); D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2011); D Cowan, 
L Fox O’Mahony and N Cobb, Great Debates in Land Law (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2016). 
51 C Gurney, ‘Lowering the Drawbridge: A Case Study of Analogy and Metaphor in the Social Construction of 
Homeownership’ (1999) 36 Urban Studies 1705, 1711. 
52 C Gurney, ‘Lowering the Drawbridge: A Case Study of Analogy and Metaphor in the Social Construction of 
Homeownership’ (1999) 36 Urban Studies 1705, 1717-1718. 
53 McDonald v McDonald (n 5). 
54 McDonald v McDonald (n 5). 
55 AM Honoré ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 1961). 
56 Law of Property Act 1925, s 109. 
57 Silven Properties Ltd v. Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2004] 1 WLR 997 (CA). 
58 Downsview Nominees Ltd v. First City Corporation [1993] AC 295; Medforth v. Blake [2000] Ch 86. 
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over property if another party’s rights are terminated or abandoned. As Honoré explained, it is a 
necessary condition of ownership that ‘either immediately or ultimately, the extinction of other 
interests would enure for his benefit’.59 For that reason, many land disputes can be seen in the 
following terms, namely, has a right been divested in such a way that allows the property to revert 
to the owner?  Looking at the judgment in McDonald60, it was notable that the right to manage the 
property reverted to the receivers, once they had served notice terminating Miss McDonald’s 
tenancy. Indeed, the focus of the judgment was whether Miss McDonald had a right that entitled 
her to remain in the property that took priority over the owner’s reversionary interest. According 
to Miss McDonald, she did.  Her interest was protected by Article 8, which provided an individual 
with the right to respect for her family and private life, home and correspondence.   
Nonetheless, this article will contend that insufficient attention has been given to the nature of 
Miss McDonald’s Article 8 right, or how it could fit in to the existing legal framework in England 
and Wales. While it accepts van der Walt’s contention that it is easier to consider social justice 
from a theoretical perspective that ‘does not focus exclusively or primarily on strong or central 
rights positions of property… but takes seriously the no-property interests of people and 
communities in the margins of society’,61 it will argue that the practicalities of any right to respect 
for the home should be addressed by the introduction of domestic housing legislation that is 
designed to protect a tenant’s dignity. Not only will this prevent the continuing piecemeal 
development of Article 8 by the courts, but it will also help to create legal certainty for both 
landlords and tenants. Taking into account those factors, this article will first analyse Miss 
McDonald’s claim using the personhood theory of property advanced by Radin62, progressive 
property scholarship,63 and the academic literature on home interests.64  It will then examine the 
nature of the right to respect for the home, before addressing the ways in which a tenant’s interests 
can be balanced against those of a landlord.   
 
 
Dignity-Based Rights or a Personhood Perpsective on Property?  
 
Recently, there has been much academic debate about whether or not the home should be afforded 
particular protection in law.  Drawing on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right65, Radin argued that there is a 
link between an individual’s property and her personhood.  As she explained: 
 
most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves.  
These objects are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of 
the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.66 
 
To support her argument, Radin contended that for an owner, there are certain goods that 
cannot be easily replaced if they are lost or destroyed. She describes these items as ‘personal 
                                                             
59 AM Honoré ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 1961). 
60 McDonald v McDonald (n 5). 
61 AJ van der Walt, Property in the Margins (Hart Publishing 2009). 
62 M Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957. 
63 GS Alexander and EM Peñalver, An Introduction to Property Theory (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2012); GS 
Alexander, EM Peñalver, JW Singer and LS Underkuffler, ‘A Statement of Progressive Property’ (2009) 94 Cornell 
Law Review 743; GS Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’, (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745. 
64 L Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Law and Policies (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2003); D. B. Barros, ‘Home as a Legal 
Concept’, (2006) 46 Santa Clara Law Review 225. 
65 GWF Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Berlin 1821). 
66 M Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 957, 959. 
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property’67 and for any individual, they may include antiques, family heirlooms, wedding rings and 
most importantly, the home.  Since the home is both personal property and ‘a moral nexus between 
liberty, privacy and freedom of association’,68 it followed for Radin that tenants should not be 
subject to eviction without due cause or unreasonable rent rises.69 Radin further argued that any 
residential tenancy agreement should include a non-waivable guarantee of habitability, as these 
rights are based on a tenant’s ‘dignity as a person’.70 Developing an argument advanced by 
Ackerman,71 she claimed that if residential tenancy agreements were seen as personal property, this 
could provide a justification for imposing additional costs on landlords. Put simply, a tenant’s right 
to enjoy her personal property may override a landlord’s interest in any fungible goods.   
Extrapolating Radin’s argument, it could be argued that English law fails to recognise residential 
tenancy agreements as personal property adequately or at all.  By way of explanation, under an 
assured shorthold tenancy, a landlord’s reversion is not conditional on a length of a tenant’s 
occupation or continued good behavior.72 On a similar note, there is no rent control for these 
tenancies in the private rented sector. With regards to the judgments in McDonald,73 it should be 
noted that the courts failed to address Miss McDonald’s attachment to the property at 25 
Broadway Close in Witney. More specifically, there was no consideration of Miss McDonald’s day-
to-day use of the property, or the steps that she had taken to make it home. Yet given the 
precarious nature of Miss McDonald’s occupation and the legal basis of her claim, this is hardly 
surprising.   
Nevertheless, from a review of the judgment, it remains difficult to ascertain Miss McDonald’s 
connection to the property or its link with her personhood. Unfortunately, that necessarily raises 
a question: can Radin’s theory provide a sound basis for the protection of Miss McDonald’s home 
interests under Article 8?  Of course, it could be said that there is an implicit assumption that Miss 
McDonald treated 25 Broadway Close in Witney as her personal property. The house is referred 
to as her ‘home’, with both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court concurring that Article 8 
had been engaged. However, such an argument is based on intuitive thinking, rather than evidence 
from Miss McDonald’s witnesses or empirical research. By way of explanation, Jones has argued 
that individuals have a connection to ‘things at large’74, rather than particular items of personal 
property, such as a home. Relying on research from material-cultural studies, he cites the 
experiments by Knetsch,75 where individuals demonstrated a loss aversion to everyday fungible 
objects, such as coffee cups, chocolate bars and lottery tickets.76 That supports a structuralist 
account of a person’s relationships with ‘things’ as advanced by Miller.77 It implies that the self is 
constituted through a dynamic process of externalisation involving all objects, as opposed to items 
of personal property that require special protection. 
Furthermore, Radin’s theory fails to address adequately the different views that an individual 
may hold about her home, as well as the way in which these are spatially and temporally located. 
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Take the home of a victim of domestic violence. At first, that home may have seemed to be a place 
of sanctuary or retreat, but this may change after an incident of abuse. For, as Schnably explained, 
‘the home is as much a place of domination and resistance, conflict and discord, as it is the centre 
of a “healthy” life’.78 Similarly, a tenant may enter into an assured shorthold tenancy with a private 
landlord, knowing that it may only last for six months and she may be evicted without due cause.  
In those circumstances, she may decide to treat a house less as personal property and more as a 
fungible asset. This may involve the tenant using furniture belonging to the landlord. Alternatively, 
she may decide not to carry out any repairs that would usually be undertaken by the owner. In 
addition, there are likely to be conditions in a residential tenancy agreement that prevent a tenant 
from treating a house as her personal property.  Common tenants’ covenants may include a duty 
not to alter the property without the landlord’s permission, or a prohibition on keeping pets.79  
These covenants are a way for the landlord to retain control of the property for the duration of 
the tenancy. After all, if a tenant is unable to use a property as she chooses, she is less likely to 
perceive that it is ‘hers’ or develop an attachment to the house.  
Aside from that, this article will claim that Radin’s theory fails to provide an adequate 
explanation for Miss McDonald’s interest in her home because it does not distinguish between 
items of personal property and property that is necessary to maintain a person’s dignity.  To give 
an example: a person needs appropriate items of clothing to be able to carry out her day-to-day 
business or progress in life.  This may mean she has warm jumpers for cold weather or a business 
suit for work.  Similarly, an individual may need a mobile phone to communicate with others and 
access the internet, as a way of maintaining her dignity.80 Applying Radin’s theory, these items of 
clothing and a person’s mobile phone would be deemed to be fungible property. To suggest 
otherwise for Radin is fetishism, particularly as they can be easily replaced with substitute goods.  
Yet, if an individual was left without adequate clothing, that could have a significant impact on her 
dignity.  She may be unable to find employment, or stigmatised for her appearance.81 Meanwhile, 
it is accepted that access to the internet forms part of an individual’s right to freedom of 
expression82 and is an ‘essential part of everyday living’.83 For those reasons, it is perhaps more 
helpful to analyse Miss McDonald’s interest in her home at 25 Broadway Close in Witney in terms 
of it upholding and maintaining her dignity, rather than it constituting personal property.        
 
 
Human Flourishing and the Home  
 
Dating back to ancient Rome, the concept of dignity or dignitas hominis came from an individual’s 
role in public office and the respect that should be owed to a citizen with that status.84 Over time, 
dignity began to be understood as a way of distinguishing Man from animals,85 before Kant 
conceptualised it as a requirement to treat persons as autonomous beings, with the ability to make 
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their own decisions.86 It has since been seen in responses to the Holocaust,87 while others have 
invoked it in the protection of indigenous rights,88 and the use of genetic material.89 Of course, 
that is not to say that the meaning of human dignity is uncontested,90 but rather there is a ‘minimum 
core’ as to what this concept may involve.91 More specifically, McCrudden has argued that dignity 
is based on an ‘ontological’ claim relating to an individual’s worth as a human being, together with 
a ‘relational’ aspect that requires others to respect this intrinsic worth by refraining from certain 
conduct. Arguably, this emphasis on human dignity can be seen in progressive property 
scholarship. So, according to Alexander and Peñalver, the law should promote human flourishing 
by providing individuals with the opportunity to lead a well-lived life through the development of 
their own capabilities.92 This could involve an acknowledgment that some members of a 
community may require resources to support their development, or the imposition of a duty on a 
landowner to contribute towards the public good. Most importantly, however, they have argued 
that property law should allow individuals to obtain the material necessities they need to flourish 
as human beings, be it clothes, food, or shelter.93   
To apply McCrudden’s ‘minimum core’ of dignity to housing, it could be argued this requires a 
tenant’s inherent worth to be protected against any degrading conduct by her landlord or the state.  
That may mean she is not subject to unlawful dispossession, and is allowed to use her home freely 
without any unreasonable interference.94 At this juncture, it is perhaps helpful to note that human 
dignity may derive from due process.95 To an extent, this is evident in English law, where it is a 
criminal offence for a landlord to evict a tenant without first obtaining an order for possession.96  
However, as long as a landlord has complied with all of the necessary formalities,97 there is no 
requirement for her to provide a tenant with a reason for her eviction.98 That, in itself, could have 
a detrimental effect on a tenant’s dignity, and further, it may mean she is denied the opportunity 
for human flourishing. It is against this background that Miss McDonald argued that she should 
be able to challenge the proportionality of her eviction. In other words, the inadequacy of the 
accelerated possession procedure meant that Miss McDonald’s dignity was infringed. Further, it 
could be argued that Miss McDonald was using Article 8 as a way of substantively protecting her 
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own dignity. It was not a proprietary claim for a right to housing, or even a right to respect for the 
home. Instead, the claim was founded on the harm Miss McDonald would suffer if she lost her 
home. To use the language of progressive property, Miss McDonald was claiming that if she was 
evicted from the property at 25 Broadway Close in Witney, she would be denied the opportunity 
for human flourishing.  In that regard, it is notable that the expert medical evidence of Dr Sargent 
found there was a significant risk that Miss McDonald would commit suicide, become homeless, 
or be admitted to hospital if she lost her home.   
Furthermore, this implicit consideration of a tenant’s wellbeing can be seen in other claims 
where an Article 8 defence has been raised by a social renter against a local authority, such as in 
Southend-on-Sea Borough Council v. Armour.99 In that case, Mr Armour successfully challenged his 
eviction from an introductory tenancy on the grounds of anti-social behaviour. Both the 
Recorder100 and the Court of Appeal took Mr Armour’s depression and Asperger’s Syndrome into 
account in their judgments.  They held that that even though Mr Armour had mental health issues, 
his conduct had improved over the course of his tenancy and his eviction could no longer be 
justified.  Likewise, the courts referred to a tenant’s depression in Hall,101 and the effects of a severe 
head injury in Price102.            
Before progressing any further, it should be noted that this notion of human dignity has been 
subject to criticism. By way of explanation, dignity has been characterised as being ‘vacuous’,103 
while others have argued that it is an empty concept that lacks an agreed definition.104 Nonetheless, 
dignity may be regarded as having both subjective and objective elements.105 In other words, it 
must be understood from the perspective of the victim who is subject to the degrading treatment, 
as well as in relation to the norms of her community. For example, if dignity was only assessed by 
reference to an individual’s perception of her treatment, that may lead to its unequal and uneven 
application. It may also provide the greatest protection for unduly sensitive individuals at the 
expense of others in the community. On the other hand, if there was no subjective element, that 
may mean that an individual’s particular circumstances are not adequately addressed. That in itself 
could further undermine a person’s dignity.  In Canada, the courts have adopted this subjective-
objective approach to dignity, with the test being whether a reasonable person with the claimant’s 
history, character traits and personal circumstances would have considered the conduct 
demeaning.106    
In relation to property, there is an objective element to dignity, meaning that it can be assessed 
in relation to an agreed list of criteria. Simply put, property can be said to uphold an individual’s 
dignity if its loss, damage, or destruction causes a real or significant interference with that person’s 
day-to-day life  Of course, what constitutes a real or significant interference with a person’s day-
to-day life is subjective:  it depends on her particular circumstances. Take the example of a car or 
a bicycle. If this is stolen, its owner may not be able to travel to work or any necessary 
appointments. That could affect her health and ability to provide for her family. From the 
perspective of progressive property scholars,107 she has been denied the material necessities 
required for human-flourishing and a well-lived life. To that end, it is notable that Radin 
acknowledged that if personal property was defined by an individual’s attachment to an object or 
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a thing, the law would simply enforce a utilitarian scheme based on personal preference.108  
Looking at housing, it should be noted that any eviction is likely to have a real and significant effect 
on an individual’s day-to-day life. As the ECtHR has emphasised, it should be regarded as the 
‘most extreme form of interference’109 with the home.  Nonetheless, the effects of dispossession 
on an individual are likely to depend on a number of factors, including the form of tenure and the 
reasons for her eviction, as well as their perceived fairness.110 As Barros has commented ‘there is 
a lot of research that needs to be done before legal discussion can be well-informed by the 
psychology of the home’.111     
Moreover, this subjective-objective concept of dignity has some advantages over Radin’s 
personhood theory. With regards to housing and Miss McDonald’s claim, it means there is no 
requirement on a tenant to prove her connection with her home.  All she must do is demonstrate 
that the loss of property has affected her general wellbeing and ontological security.112  After all, if 
a tenant was required to demonstrate an attachment to her home, that could have a fundamental 
effect on her dignity in itself.  Such an exercise may be both intrusive and unnecessary, particularly 
given that an individual’s right to a private life is also protected within the ambit of Article 8.  
Further, there is a risk that personhood theory may favour those with belongings and a settled 
home at the expense of vulnerable individuals.  Imagine that a few weeks ago, a tenant moved into 
a room in a House in Multiple Occupation (‘HMO’) to escape domestic violence. Using Radin’s 
notion of personal property, it follows that the tenant’s occupation of the property should be 
afforded the same protection as a fungible asset.  She may not have lived in the property for a 
sufficient length of time to develop a connection that allows her to call the place ‘home’.  Yet, if 
we examine the rights of the same tenant from the perspective of her dignity, it follows that her 
occupation of the room must be protected from the date she arrived.  Without this room, she may 
find herself living in abusive or degrading conditions, where her rights are inadequately protected, 
and interests subordinated.113 In other words, the room is a material necessity for her flourishing.  
Similar considerations apply to those living in poor conditions. For instance, if a tenant is living 
with inadequate heating or limited access to services, she may not be attached to the property in 
the sense envisaged by Radin, but rather as a result of having nowhere else to go.   
In addition, the difficulties associated with Radin’s personhood theory are further illustrated by 
the House of Lords’ judgment in Westminster City Council v. Clarke.114 That case concerned Mr 
Clarke’s occupation of a room in a hostel for single, homeless men at 131-137 Cambridge Street 
in London.  As Lord Templemann noted, the occupiers included:  
 
men with personality disorders or physical disabilities, sometimes eccentric, 
sometimes frail, sometimes evicted from domestic accommodation or 
discharged from prison or hospital.115   
 
It was against that background that Westminster City Council sought to evict Mr Clarke from 
his room for nuisance, annoyance, and noise. More specifically, it was alleged that he had smashed 
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up his room and thrown furniture and clothing into the street. To challenge his eviction, Mr Clarke 
argued that he was a tenant of Westminster City Council, with exclusive possession of his room at 
the hostel.116 Despite this, the House of Lords rejected Mr Clarke’s argument and held that the 
local authority had retained some control over his room. In reaching this decision, the House of 
Lords emphasised that it was in the best interests of both the local authority and Mr Clarke for the 
hostel to operate in a harmonious and efficient manner. If so required, Westminster City Council 
needed to be able to move a resident to another room or require an occupier to comply with the 
directions of the warden. Yet, it is notable that the House of Lords did not address Mr Clarke’s 
occupation of the property at 131-137 Cambridge Street in London adequately or at all. In 
particular, it is unclear if residents adhered to the warden’s decisions, or moved rooms regularly.   
Since the House of Lords was concerned with whether Mr Clarke had a secure tenancy under 
the Housing Act 1980, there was little consideration of how his eviction from the hostel would 
affect his dignity. Indeed, the judgment did not examine Mr Clarke’s personal circumstances, his 
mental health, or the possible consequences of his eviction from the hostel. Returning to Radin’s 
personhood theory, it could be argued that Lord Templemann’s decision implied that Mr Clarke 
did not value his belongings as either personal property or fungible goods, having damaged the 
council’s furniture and thrown away his own clothing. As such, Mr Clarke’s conduct did not 
conform to our social norms of ownership, or even Radin’s notion of how we deal with ‘treasured 
property’.117 Rather, Mr Clarke’s conduct demonstrates his ‘otherness’ in relation to our usual 
norms of property. To use Bauman’s definition,118 he is acting in a manner that is diametrically 
opposed to the individual envisaged by Radin, who both treasures her personal property and 
considers it constitutive of her personality. For that reason, there is a risk that Radin’s notion of 
personal property does not adequately protect the needs of the ‘other’ or those who are outside 
the perceived norms of society. By contrast, if Mr Clarke’s rights are based on his dignity and 
ability to live a well-lived life, it is not necessary for a court to consider how he should use his 
possessions. The question is simply whether that property is necessary for flourishing and 
wellbeing.119 Of course, that is not to say that the concept of dignity is uncontested, but it does 
address this criticism of personhood theory, as well as those advanced by Barros120 and Stern.121   
Turning first to Barros, he claims that Radin’s theory does not take account of the way that 
certain values of the home are moveable. As he explains, ‘when a person moves, the zone of 
privacy, freedom, and autonomy also moves’.122 Barros further argues that an individual’s 
connection to her home may transfer when she moves to a new property, particularly once she 
has personalised it with her own belongings. Applying this criticism, it could be argued that an 
individual’s dignity derives from an individual’s use of a property as ‘home’, rather than her 
relationship to one particular place. Here, it is perhaps pertinent to refer to Fox’s ‘meanings of 
home’, being home as a financial investment, a physical structure, identity, territory and a social 
and cultural unit.123 These ‘meanings of home’ may be understood in the context of progressive 
property, as they demonstrate why the home is necessary to uphold a person’s dignity. So, for 
example, the home may provide an individual with privacy and shelter, or act as a space for social 
and cultural gatherings. In the same way, an individual has some control over who has access to 
her home.  She may choose to exclude cold callers, door-to-door salesmen, or even her landlord 
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if she had no notice of the visit.124 Taken together, these factors suggest that the home is property 
that contributes to human flourishing and therefore, it should be the subject of particular 
protection.   
Stern has noted that there is some evidence that individuals adapt to new surroundings with 
relative ease,125 commenting that: 
 
Forced relocation carries more risk of negative mental health effects than 
voluntary relocation, but for most people the long-term effects are still benign.126 
 
From a dignity perspective, this can be explained by the move being an individual’s choice.  In 
other words, she has decided to leave one property to live in another: it is not a result of her 
circumstances, the landlord’s unreasonable decision or repossession by the bank.  In essence, she 
has maintained control over her surroundings and upheld her dignity in doing so.  More recently, 
however, empirical research has demonstrated that eviction may be both symptomatic and 
causative of poverty.127 If a person is forced to seek accommodation, that may prevent her from 
seeking employment or entering education. In effect, she is being denied the opportunity to live a 
well-lived life.  For instance, in its report, Poverty, Eviction and Forced Moves,128 the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation found that tenants were struggling to find alternative accommodation after a forced 
move. In part, that was caused by their inability to pay agency fees or a deposit, as well as by 
landlords requiring references and a guarantor.129 Stern further claims that social ties are more likely 
to be constitutive of personhood than property.130 Here, it is perhaps pertinent to note that 
Alexander and Peñalver conceived that one of the four capabilities required to live a full life was 
sociality.131 Therefore, if a court is required to consider an individual’s dignity, it may examine her 
relationships with others as part of that exercise. This can, however, create practical difficulties for 
the courts in interpreting an individual’s human rights and this is addressed in further detail below.  
 
 
 
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING ARTICLE 8 AND THE JUDGMENT IN 
MCDONALD  
 
 
The Horizontal Nature of Article 8 
 
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the ECHR has direct effect against public authorities.132 So, 
for example, an individual may bring a claim against a public authority for breaching her rights 
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under the Convention,133 or seek judicial relief from the court.134 Yet, even though the Human 
Rights Act 1998 does not apply to private individuals, it can be described as having horizontal 
effect. This may arise from the court’s duty to interpret legislation in accordance with the ECHR135 
or its status as a public authority.136 In addition, there may be a duty of ‘intermediate horizontality’ 
on the state, requiring it to ensure that the rights of individuals are properly protected.  As 
Gardbaum has argued,137 horizontal effect is concerned with the application of the existing law. It 
does not provide a person with a distinct cause of action against a private individual. Nevertheless, 
the nature of horizontal effect under the Human Rights Act 1998 has been the subject of much 
debate,138 particularly with regards to how the ECHR may apply to causes of action as between 
private individuals. For example, some academics, including Wade,139 Morgan,140 Beyleveld, and 
Pattinson,141 have argued for full horizontal effect, where the courts may develop new causes of 
action to protect an individual’s Convention rights. By way of contrast, Williams and Phillipson142 
have advanced a ‘constitutional constraint’ model, with the law being developed incrementally and 
in accordance with broader principles of governmentality.  
Against that background, the Supreme Court has been criticised for failing to engage with the 
concept of horizontal effect in McDonald143 adequately,144 with Pascoe145 referring to its absence 
from the judgment.146 Nevertheless, in McDonald,147 the court was mainly concerned with the 
interpretation of s 21(4) Housing Act 1988, as well as the horizontal effect arising from s 3 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. To a degree, this aspect of the judgment was straightforward. As Lees 
pointed out,148 the provisions in the Housing Act 1988 were mandatory and did not allow for any 
proportionality assessment of a tenant’s eviction. As such, if the Supreme Court had accepted Miss 
McDonald’s claim, it should have issued a declaration of incompatibility. As a matter of contrast, 
it would have been much more problematic for Miss McDonald’s claim to be framed as a breach 
of the court’s duty to act in a manner that was compatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights under s 6 Human Rights Act 1998, as is evident from the Court of Appeal’s 
decision.149 In that respect, it has been argued that a court may be acting in breach of an individual’s 
rights under Article 1, Protocol 1 when it makes an order, depriving her of property or requiring 
her to pay damages.150 From this, it follows that for Miss McDonald’s claim to succeed, she would 
need to demonstrate that any interference with her right to respect for the home arose, not as a 
matter of the landlord seeking possession of the property, but rather as a result of the court making 
the possession order. This ignores the court’s role as ‘merely the forum for the determination of 
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the civil right in dispute between the parties’,151 as well as the question of causation  In other words, 
the court cannot make a possession order unless a private landlord has served the correct notice, 
complied with all of the necessary formalities and issued a possession claim.152 If it did so, the court 
would be acting outside its powers and any judgment could be challenged by way of judicial review.   
Despite this, there is no legislation that provides a tenant with a specific remedy if a private 
landlord interferes with her right to respect for the home, or acts disproportionately in seeking 
eviction. For Howell,153 this reasoning creates a degree of circularity. It further demonstrates that 
there is a ‘liability gap’ in English law with regards to the application of Article 8 in the private 
rented sector. Essentially, it means that a tenant has no effective remedy against either her private 
landlord or the state. All she is able to do is seek a declaration of incompatibility, claiming that the 
state has failed to protect her Article 8 rights adequately. There is no corresponding obligation on 
Parliament to address that incompatibility or amend the law in response. In these circumstances, 
it is only the concept of ‘intermediate horizontality’ that may provide a tenant with effective 
protection of her Article 8 rights on an eviction by a private landlord. However, this may depend 
on the nature of those rights, as well the practicalities of balancing them against the interests of a 
private landlord.   
 
 
Private Landlords and Public Functions  
 
Regardless of whether a tenant’s interest in her home is based on dignity or Radin’s notion of 
personal property, this article will contend that her rights will only be properly protected if there 
are corresponding duties of the landlord that can be enforced. This is necessary from both a 
theoretical perspective and for the purpose of ensuring that an individual’s rights under Article 8 
are effective, as was illustrated in McDonald.154 To clarify, if a tenant is aware of what her landlord 
must do, she will be able to take steps to ensure that those rights are enforced. This may involve 
her reporting poor housing conditions to the local authority,155 or bringing proceedings against her 
landlord in court. Aside from that, it will allow a tenant to plead a claim against a landlord with 
clarity and in a way that entitles her to an effective remedy. The importance of this clarity can be 
seen in both the overriding objective in the Civil Procedure Rules 1998,156 as well as the Pre-Action 
Protocols for Mortgage Arrears, Housing Disrepair and Possession Claims by Social Landlords.  
Similarly, it is necessary for a landlord to be aware of her common law and statutory duties, both 
in relation to the property itself and her relationship with her tenants. Without this awareness, 
there is a real risk that a landlord may fail to comply with any regulation or respect her tenants’ 
rights. In turn, that could affect the health of a tenant, as well as her general wellbeing and 
ontological security.   
Turning to a landlord’s duty, it should be noted that a private individual is not able to exercise 
the same coercive powers as the state.157 She may have little information about her tenant’s 
personal circumstances, and in any event, she is unable to obtain any records held by the relevant 
authorities about her tenant’s health, income or household expenses without consent. In part, this 
may explain why a person’s human rights are protected against the unlawful interference of the 
state, as opposed to the conduct of private individuals. Notwithstanding this, it has been argued 
that the distinction between the public sphere and private relationships is necessarily amorphous, 
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contrived, and outdated.158 It fails to take account of the fact that a person may still have her human 
rights infringed by another individual, company, or business.159 In the context of housing, for 
example, it could be argued that a tenant’s eviction represents a breach of her Article 8 rights. She 
has been left without a home, and that could lead to real financial hardship.160 Further, as Hunt 
has claimed,161 law is a construct of the state, which applies to relationships between private 
individuals. If it is accepted that the state is responsible for enacting these laws, it follows that the 
power of individuals, companies, and corporations derives from the action of government. For 
these reasons, it has been argued that it is artificial to limit claims under the Human Rights Act 
1998 to relationships between citizens and the state.162        
Nevertheless, the definition of a public authority in the Human Rights Act 1998 is not 
concerned with the power that a company, charity or trust may exert over a private individual. 
Instead, the courts will examine whether a body is exercising a public function.163 Applying this 
test in YL v Birmingham City Council,164 Lord Bingham noted that this may depend on whether a 
company has a statutory function or is providing services that should be the responsibility of the 
state. In addition, the judgment considered the extent to which the state paying for a service meant 
that it is deemed to be a public function. In his minority opinion, Lord Bingham commented ‘the 
greater the state’s involvement in making payment for the function in question, the greater (other 
things being equal) is its assumption of responsibility’.165 However, Lord Scott argued that in this 
case, the local authority had paid the fees of a private care home on ‘ordinary commercial terms’.166 
In particular, the care home had not received a public subsidy and further, since the local authority 
was paying fees on a private basis, it had a remedy against the care home in private law. That placed 
the local authority in a position that was analogous to a private individual, who is paying for the 
fees using her own resources. 
If the House of Lords had accepted that a private care home was providing a public function 
by providing accommodation to an elderly resident under a contract with the local authority, that 
could have had a significant impact on the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to private 
individuals. More specifically, it could have led to tenants claiming that their landlords are carrying 
out a public function, where the rent is paid by them using Local Housing Allowance (‘LHA’). To 
support their claims, tenants could argue that it is the local authority that is paying for their rent 
and further, it is accommodating them in the private rented sector as part of the duty that it owes 
to those who have been made unintentionally homeless.167 However, if the courts had accepted 
that some private landlords were carrying out a public function, that may have created a system 
where there was unequal and uneven protection for tenants in the private rented sector. It would 
mean that individual cases would need to be reviewed to determine whether a landlord was acting 
in a public or private capacity, creating uncertainty for both landlord and tenant. In turn, that may 
lead to an increasing number of landlords refusing to let property to tenants claiming benefits, 
making it more difficult for the most vulnerable individuals to find decent accommodation. If it is 
accepted that a tenant’s rights in her home should be based on values of human dignity, it follows 
that this position is unsustainable. In effect, it means that a tenant’s rights under Article 8 are 
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dependent on both the nature of her landlord168 and her relationship with the state. Taking these 
factors into consideration, it is evident that Article 8 does not adequately protect the rights of all 
tenants. That can only be addressed by the introduction of domestic legislation that focuses on 
upholding an individual’s dignity through the rights she has in her home.     
 
 
Defining a Tenant’s Rights Under Article 8   
 
Taking this into account, it should be noted that there are difficulties in ascertaining the nature of 
an Article 8 right and, in turn, that has had an effect on determining any correlative duties that 
may be imposed on landlords or the state. Firstly, it is unclear what legal effect should be afforded 
to the words ‘respect’ and ‘home’ in Article 8. By way of example, does a right to ‘respect’ for the 
home provide an occupier with the opportunity to challenge her eviction, or alternatively impose 
a requirement that she should be entitled to an effective remedy for any breach? Who has standing 
to bring a claim under Article 8 and on what basis? To an extent, the jurisprudence may assist in 
answering those questions: an individual’s rights under Article 8 are not based on whether she has 
an interest in the property through possession, use or control, but rather her relationship with the 
land.169 In particular, there is no requirement for her to hold an estate in land170 and it is even 
possible for a claim to be made out by a trespasser.171   
Moreover, Article 8 is defined by the circumstances in which it is engaged, rather than by the 
nature of the right itself.172 Using England and Wales as an example, it has been invoked in 
challenges to the bedroom tax, 173as well as cases where a canal boat was removed from the 
waterways174 and long leaseholders sought to challenge a compulsory purchase order.175 Even so, 
this is still problematic. Simply put, it means that Article 8 cannot easily be analysed in the context 
of other property rights in the ‘bundle of sticks’ metaphor,176 such as the right to use, the right to 
charge, or the right to possess. It is a right that is associated with dignity,177 as well as values such 
as wellbeing and freedom that are constitutive of ourselves as individuals.178 As such, it follows 
that it falls outside the numerus clausus principle.179 Consequently, there is uncertainty as to how it 
may affect the rights of third parties, strangers, or even those with a direct interest in the property.  
For instance, in McDonald180 there was a lack of clarity as to the remedy that was sought. More 
specifically, there was no indication in the judgment of whether Miss McDonald was simply 
seeking for possession of her home to be deferred, or alternatively, if she was arguing that Capital 
Homes should not be entitled to sell the property at all. In turn, that created doubt over the duty 
that Capital Homes owed Miss McDonald, as well as the conduct that was required for it to comply 
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with Article 8. In these circumstances, even if Capital Homes wished to uphold Miss McDonald’s 
right to respect for the home, it would be unable to do so.    
Aside from that, Article 8 differs from some proprietary rights in the sense that it is concerned 
with one particular type of property, being a person’s home. For the ECtHR, ‘home’ is a place 
where an individual has ‘sufficient and continuing links’.181 According to the jurisprudence, it is 
still possible for a property to be ‘home’ if an individual has let it to tenants182 or has been forcibly 
dispossessed from the land.183 It has been found to include a caravan,184 business premises185 and 
may even apply in circumstances where the occupier is not an owner or a tenant.186 Notably, in the 
context of English law, it has been pleaded widely to include squatters,187 as well as those living at 
a protest camp.188 From a practical perspective, this definition is necessarily wide: it protects 
individuals with different interests in land, where their continued occupation may be under threat. 
As a result, it is often uncontroversial when Article 8 is engaged. Take residential landlord and 
tenant law as an example, where the purpose of a lease is to provide the tenant with 
accommodation to use as a home. Nevertheless, with this definition of ‘home’, there is a risk that 
an owner may have little control over whether her land becomes the subject of an occupier’s claim 
under Article 8. As such, she may be unable to regulate her behaviour to take account of those 
interests. In that regard, it is perhaps pertinent to note that our use of land is becoming increasingly 
complex and fragmented. For instance, can we say that Article 8 now protects the interests of a 
property guardian,189 or someone occupying a property on a long-term basis using Airbnb?190 Buyse 
has argued that when deciding whether a property is ‘home’, the courts will consider if an individual 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.191 Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how this test would 
be applied in the context of today’s housing crisis or the sharing economy.      
Besides the difficulties of defining ‘home’, it should be noted that the scope of a tenant’s rights 
may depend on a state’s implementation of the ECHR.  According to the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation, a state has a limited ability to derogate from its Convention obligations. As Allen 
has noted,192 this doctrine recognises that there are social, economic, and political differences 
between states that may affect how Convention rights are realised in practice. In this context, it is 
perhaps pertinent to note that human rights are often understood as being conditional and 
contingent on the society in which they operate.193 With regards to Article 8, the notion of ‘respect’ 
can be difficult to define and there is therefore usually a wide margin of appreciation for states in 
implementing any rules.194 More specifically, Article 8 is not a right to housing that imposes a 
positive obligation on states to provide citizens with a place to live,195 in contrast to other 
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jurisdictions such as India196 and South Africa.197 Of course, it should be noted that there is 
necessarily a connection between human dignity and respect. After all, if an individual is treated 
without respect, that means that she has been subject to conduct that undermines her dignity. 
Likewise, if the conduct towards an individual lacks respect, this may demonstrate that her dignity 
has been infringed. In the context of housing, an eviction represents a serious interference with an 
individual’s rights under Article 8, entitling an occupier to have the proportionality of this measure 
determined by an independent tribunal.198 As such, the margin of appreciation in this area is 
necessarily narrow, but it still exists in the application of any proportionality test. Nonetheless, it 
would be within the margin of appreciation for one state to find that an eviction is justified, while 
another holds it to be unlawful.        
Arguably, this uncertainty over the ambit of tenants’ rights and a landlord’s duty has 
implications for the rule of law. Here, it is perhaps helpful to refer to Fuller’s eight precepts that 
governed law-making in The Morality of Law.199 According to Fuller, any law should be: (i) general; 
(ii) public; (iii) prospective; (iv) clear and understandable; (v) not contradictory; (vi) capable of 
compliance; (vii) stable and not subject to unnecessary change; and (viii) adhered to by the state.  
In support of his argument, Fuller employed the use of an allegorical king, Rex.  Throughout his 
reign, Rex misused his power with the effect that his subjects did not know what to do or how 
they should regulate their conduct. In turn, that led to picketing, protests, and disillusionment, 
while the first act of his successor was to place government in the hands of psychiatrists and 
experts in public relations. Using Fuller’s precepts, it follows that the lack of clarity surrounding 
Article 8 is problematic, particularly as it raises questions as to whether the law is capable of 
compliance, as well as being sufficiently public, prospective and comprehensible.   
Although Fuller’s theory has been subject to much academic criticism,200 it is widely accepted 
that the eight precepts remain useful criteria for assessing legality, be it from a perspective of 
efficiency or morality.201 In that regard, it has been argued that there is a moral value in adhering 
to Fuller’s precepts because they are necessary for upholding human dignity. Notably, Waldron 
has claimed that if a government decides to rule through law, it does so on the understanding that 
its subjects are capable of regulating their behaviour in accordance with legal rules and society’s 
norms.202 As Raz explained ‘respecting human dignity entails treating human beings as capable of 
plotting and planning their future’.203 At this juncture, it is useful to remember that this article has 
contended that a tenant’s rights under Article 8 may be based on the importance of the home in 
upholding human dignity. Even so, this creates a conundrum. If a tenant’s rights under Article 8 
are not protected, that may have a significant effect on her dignity or ability to function as a human 
being. Yet at the same time, if a landlord cannot ascertain her duties to a tenant, she will be unable 
to control her behaviour to comply with the law. That too may represent a failure to uphold a 
landlord’s dignity. Therefore, this article will suggest that the only way that both a landlord and 
tenant’s rights can be protected is through the use of legislation, which strikes a proper balance 
between the interests of the two individuals.          
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Balancing the Rights of Landlord and Tenant  
 
If the Supreme Court had accepted Miss McDonald’s claim, it may have read s 21(4) Housing Act 
1988 in such a way that it was compliant with the provisions of the ECHR204 That could have 
involved the implication of a proportionality test into summary possession proceedings against a 
private landlord, requiring judges to consider whether a tenant’s eviction was a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.205 With such a test, the courts would need to address the 
factual circumstances that should be taken into account when deciding whether a tenant’s eviction 
is proportionate, as well as any remedies that may be available. Further, it would need to consider 
whether it had struck a fair balance between the respective Convention rights of both landlord and 
tenant. Therefore, this article will review both aspects of a proportionality test as it may apply to 
possession proceedings in the private rented sector.    
Turning to the factual circumstances of an eviction, the Supreme Court held in Pinnock206 that 
with social housing, there is a rebuttable presumption that the local authority or housing 
association has a justified reason for seeking possession of a property, being the management of 
its housing stock. In comparison, a private landlord may exercise her right to evict a tenant for a 
wider range of reasons. She may be seeking to realise the capital in the property, use it for future 
rentals, or as a home. Alternatively, there may have been a disagreement between the landlord and 
tenant over rent, arrears, or the upkeep of the property. Taking that into account, could any of 
these considerations be a legitimate reason for a private landlord to evict a tenant from her home? 
In this context, it should be noted that there is no requirement on a private landlord to provide a 
tenant with a reason for her eviction or demonstrate that she was at fault.207 Consequently, it can 
be difficult to ascertain why a tenant has been evicted, both for the tenant herself and the court.208 
After all, if a tenant is not given a reason for her eviction, she may struggle to demonstrate that 
the landlord is acting disproportionately or for an improper purpose. That in itself raises a question 
as to whether the accelerated possession procedure is sufficient to protect a tenant’s dignity.   
Further, it should be noted that the courts tend to carry out a balancing exercise in the context 
of existing legislation209 or causes of action.210 With claims under Article 8, there is little judicial or 
statutory guidance as to the relevant factors that the courts should take into account in determining 
a case, or the weight that they should be given. So, for example, it is unclear how much emphasis 
a court should place on a tenant’s mental health issues,211 the financial interests of a third-party 
lender,212 or any delay in seeking possession. More specifically, an eviction may be proportionate 
if it is delayed for a certain number of weeks, as opposed to being carried out at short notice. As 
Nield has argued,213 this creates difficulties for the uniform application of the law. Without further 
guidance, there is a risk that certain courts or judges could be perceived as being ‘landlord-friendly’ 
or ‘tenant-friendly’, meaning there is a ‘postcode lottery’ for litigants in the application of the 
proportionality test under Article 8.  
Despite these difficulties in determining a landlord’s reason for a tenant’s eviction, the 
circumstances in which an Article 8 claim may be made out against a private landlord are likely to 
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be limited and exceptional in nature. In McDonald,214 the Supreme Court held that Capital Homes 
was acting for a legitimate purpose in realising its security in the property. According to Lord 
Neuberger and Lady Hale, Miss McDonald would only have been able to remain in the property 
if she could demonstrate that her eviction was disproportionate, and Capital Homes would be 
repaid all of the outstanding sums under the mortgage. Put differently, Miss McDonald’s 
occupation of the property at 25 Broadway Close in Witney was always dependent on her ability 
to pay rent, rather than her attachment to her home or any objective of human dignity. 
Furthermore, with social housing, most Article 8 claims have only succeeded if a tenant has been 
able to demonstrate that her landlord’s conduct is Wednesbury215 unreasonable.216   
By way of contrast, there has been little academic consideration as to how the courts will assess 
a private landlord’s decision to evict in any proportionality assessment. This article will contend 
that this matter is best addressed by legislation, but in any event, it must follow that an eviction is 
more likely to be disproportionate if it is for an arbitrary or vexatious reason. Take the example of 
a landlord who issued possession proceedings against a tenant for wearing a green hat every day.217 
That cannot be regarded as being discriminatory under the Equality Act 2010. Rather it is an 
arbitrary reason based on a landlord’s personal prejudice, which may represent a breach of the 
tenant’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10. So, to draw out a principle for a 
proportionality assessment for the private rented sector: a court is more likely to find that a tenant’s 
eviction was disproportionate, if other Convention rights have been infringed,218 or the conduct is 
contrary to equality legislation.219 Further, it could be argued that this conduct is contrary to a 
tenant’s dignity. By way of explanation, if a tenant was being evicted by the landlord as a result of 
a personal feud, that may mean her eviction is disproportionate given the harm that she would 
suffer. By way of contrast, if a tenant is evicted because the landlord is planning to use the property 
as a home, that may be justifiable. Put differently, an eviction may be disproportionate if it is for a 
reason that significantly undermines a tenant’s dignity.  
Usually, a tenant will claim that her eviction is a breach of Article 8, while a landlord may rely 
on her rights under Article 1, Protocol 1. As Lord Neuberger and Lady Hale explained: 
 
a private sector landlord can claim that any delay in giving him possession of the 
property to which he is entitled would be an interference with his rights under 
Article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention.220 
 
Notwithstanding this, that is not an exhaustive list of all the Convention rights that may be 
relevant to a proportionality test in a possession claim. In certain circumstances, a tenant may 
allege that her eviction is contrary to Article 10 or Article 14, breaching her right to freedom of 
expression221 or being discriminatory.222 More recently, Pascoe223 has claimed that eviction may 
represent a breach of a tenant’s potential Article 1, Protocol rights, using the claim in Pye v United 
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Kingdom224 as an analogy. Here, it is difficult to predict how a court would protect a tenant’s Article 
1, Protocol 1 rights under a periodic tenancy, where a new tenancy is created at the start of each 
period.225 Would these rights be deemed to be ongoing from the date on which the tenant started 
to occupy the property, or alternatively, would a court find that each period both created and 
extinguished Article 8 rights for the tenant?   
Outside of Article 1, Protocol 1, there has been little analysis of a landlord’s human rights.  
Nevertheless, a landlord may be able to rely on Article 8 if she can demonstrate that like the tenant, 
she has ‘sufficient and continuing links’ to the property.226 For example, in Gillow v United 
Kingdom227, the ECtHR accepted that Article 8 was engaged in circumstances where the owners had 
let the property to tenants for a number of years. The property was deemed to be the couple’s 
home as it contained their furniture and they intended to return on Mr Gillow’s retirement. More 
recently, the ECtHR held that it was possible for an individual to have Article 8 rights in respect 
of two properties,228 while in EP v Italy,229 the appellant landlord claimed that his Article 8 rights 
had been breached by the state’s failure to evict his tenant in a timely manner. As Lees has noted,230 
there is no hierarchy of Convention rights. As such, if the courts were asked to balance the 
competing Article 8 rights of a landlord and a tenant, there is a real risk that those interests may 
be diminished. In this case, the tenant’s dignity in remaining in her home would be at issue and 
further, it would need to balanced against the landlord’s rights in using the property freely. Any 
judgment may simply be based on existing case law or the legislative balance struck by 
Parliament,231 with the landlord’s ownership of the property taking priority over the tenant’s 
interests. Likewise, there is a lack of clarity as to how the courts would strike this balance in 
practice. Would they examine an individual’s attachment to the property, or look at the parties’ 
respective concerns?    
Once the court has considered the Convention rights that may be relevant to a proportionality 
assessment of a tenant’s eviction, it will then need to address whether or not they are engaged.  
Occasionally, this process may be straightforward. For Article 1, Protocol 1, however, the analysis 
is much more complicated. As Goymour has argued,232 there is a ‘inherent limitation’ in Article 1, 
Protocol 1 in that some property rights fall outside its scope. This is because Article 1, Protocol 1 
does not apply if an individual is deprived of her possessions in the public interest or under the 
conditions provided for by domestic or international law. Generally, this means that there is no 
breach of Article 1, Protocol 1 where an interference with an individual’s possessions involves an 
existing right or claim affecting land. After all, the individual took possession of the property, 
knowing her right was subject to those legal provisions. So, to use an example from Aston Cantlow 
v Wallbank,233 there was no breach of Article 1, Protocol 1 in respect of the Wallbanks’ use of land: 
it had always been subject to a liability to repair the chancel in the local parish church.  Had the 
state introduced a new obligation that required the Wallbanks to contribute to the repair of the 
chancel, Article 1, Protocol would have been engaged. Instead, Article 1, Protocol 1 is only 
engaged: 
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where there is a shift in the beneficial entitlement away from the person alleging 
the P1-1 infringement; it has no part to play where someone’s property rights 
are inherently delimited from the start.  P1-1 protects existing entitlements; it 
does not confer new ones.234 
 
To support this argument, Goymour gives the example of a tenant whose lease has been 
terminated.235 She claims that while the tenant may have a complaint under Article 8 or the 
provisions of the domestic law, she cannot rely on Article 1, Protocol 1 to challenge her eviction. 
There has been no shift in the proprietary entitlement, since the lease has expired.  Meanwhile, 
Lees has developed Goymour’s reasoning, claiming that a landlord will not usually be entitled to 
rely on her rights under Article 1, Protocol 1.236 A lease will always be granted subject to a tenant’s 
Article 8 rights. Assuming that Lees’ argument is correct237 and relying on the judgments in 
Pinnock238 and Powell,239 it is likely that a tenant’s Article 8 rights will be limited to the ability to have 
the proportionality of any eviction determined by an independent tribunal. Where the 
proportionality of tenant’s eviction is determined within a reasonable timescale, there will be no 
breach of a landlord’s Article 1, Protocol 1 rights.  The eviction has taken place in accordance with 
the provisions of law and that may include an assessment of the proportionality of the measure.  
On the other hand, if there is a delay in ownership reverting to the landlord, this might constitute 
deprivation or control of use,240 as well as a breach of Article 1, Protocol 1.241 In that regard, it is 
notable that Lord Neuberger claimed that it is the delay in recovering possession that may give rise 
to a landlord’s Article 1, Protocol 1 claim,242 rather than the fact of a tenant’s occupation or the 
court’s assessment of the proportionality of the eviction. 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The judgment in McDonald243 has been criticised because of its perceived unfairness in reinforcing 
the anomaly that social renters have more rights that private tenants under Article 8.244 Indeed, 
even in cases where a social renter was occupying her home under an assured shorthold tenancy 
agreement,245 the courts have found that Article 8 was engaged, and the tenant had a right to 
challenge the proportionality of her eviction. However, using the language of Hohfeld,246 a tenant’s 
Article 8 rights are defined by the nature and characteristics of her landlord, as well as the 
correlative duties that she is owed. They do not arise as a consequence of the protection that the 
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state thinks should be afforded to a tenant, but rather they are determined by whether her landlord 
is a private individual or is exercising a public function.247 From the perspective of the landlord, 
this is a way of protecting her dignity. It means that she is not subject to any duties that are 
unreasonably burdensome, or with which she cannot comply. In that regard, it is perhaps pertinent 
to note that the original purpose of the ECHR was to protect individuals against the state, after 
the serious violations during World War Two. After all, the state is able to exercise powers that 
are not afforded to the largest corporations or the most influential individuals. It may coerce, 
violate or imprison citizens if it is in accordance with the law and there is a public interest in doing 
so.248 So, although there is inequality in the relationship between landlord and tenant, there remains 
a question as to whether that in itself is sufficient to impose the same duties on a private individual. 
In comparison with the state, a private landlord is likely to have little information on the 
vulnerability or personal circumstances of her tenant. That must be correct for the purpose of 
Article 10, Article 14 and other aspects of Article 8, but it does make it difficult (if not impossible) 
for a landlord to consider the reasonableness of an eviction without starting possession 
proceedings.   
Nevertheless, by protecting a landlord’s rights, the law has failed to address the dignity that a 
private tenant has in her home, or the role that it may play in ensuring her wellbeing. Further, for 
the reasons described in this article, it is not open to private tenants to use Article 8 to challenge a 
possession claim, and therefore, it follows that domestic housing legislation is required to 
safeguard their interests. This will provide certainty for both landlords and tenants. More 
specifically, it will allow a tenant to enforce her rights effectively and ensure that a landlord is able 
to regulate her behaviour accordingly. Legislation will also ensure that certain considerations are 
given sufficient weight in any assessment of the reasonableness or proportionality of an eviction, 
be it the vulnerability of the tenant, the level of rent arrears or the length of the tenancy. As Lord 
Hope explained in Kay v London Borough of Lambeth: 
 
unless parameters and guidelines are set down, the judgment in each case will be 
a subjective one.  Every solicitor who is asked to advise an occupier will have to 
consider whether it is arguable that the decision to seek eviction was not 
proportionate.  If he decides to raise the issue, the court will have to examine 
the issue.249  
 
If Lord Hope’s argument is accepted, it follows that with legislation, there is more likely to be 
coherency and consistency in the application of the law, compared to a tenant’s Article 8 rights 
being developed on a piecemeal basis through the case law. Moreover, although the concept of 
dignity remains contested, this should be the primary consideration for determining a landlord and 
a tenant’s respective rights in relation to a rental property in any domestic legislation.  In particular, 
it may provide a justification for allowing all tenants to challenge the reason for their eviction in 
court, regardless of whether their landlord is a private individual, housing association, or a local 
authority. Yet, in addition to this procedural protection, the concept of dignity implies that tenants 
should benefit from certain substantive rights. These may relate to the condition of the property250 
or a tenant’s ability to contest an order for possession. Of course, it could be said that these rights 
are too uncertain and undermine a landlord’s interest in her property, but if the courts interpret 
the concept of dignity using a subjective-objective approach, that would ensure that a tenant’s 
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wellbeing could be assessed according to a list of agreed criteria, as well as the personal difficulties 
that she is facing.    
Needless to say, by introducing the judicial mechanism of declarations of incompatibility in the 
Human Rights Act 1998, Parliament itself has accepted that domestic law may be incompatible 
with the ECHR and that should be addressed through legislation. However, to date, the British 
Government has been reluctant to introduce legislation that significantly alters the relationship 
between landlords and tenants, or extends the ambit of the ECHR to the private rented sector. As 
the judgment in McDonald251 is the subject of an ongoing appeal to the ECtHR it remains to be 
seen whether the law will be amended in response, or if objections to legal reform will continue to 
be raised. 
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